Michigan Law Review
Volume 63

Issue 4

1965

Product Picketing-A New Loophole in Section 8(h) (4) of the
National Labor Relations Act?
Michael A. Warner
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Legislation
Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael A. Warner, Product Picketing-A New Loophole in Section 8(h) (4) of the National Labor Relations
Act?, 63 MICH. L. REV. 682 (1965).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/4

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

COMMENTS

Product Picketing-A New Loophole in Section 8(h) (4)
of the National Labor Relations Act?
Secondary pressure is that pressure resulting against the primary
employer, with whom the union is trying to bargain, when a secondary employer, who has no direct concern in the labor dispute, is
forced to cease dealing with the primary employer.1 A favored
weapon used to exert secondary pressure is the secondary boycott,
which historically has consisted of inducement of the employees of
the secondary employer to engage in a work stoppage or of inducement of the customers of the secondary employer to withhold their
business.2 This comment is an examination of the latter of these
techniques, with particular emphasis on picketing upon or near the
premises of a neutral employer in order to appeal to consumers of
the neutral to refrain from buying the neutral's products that were
produced by the employer with which the union has a dispute.
The relevant federal regulation of secondary activity is embodied "in section 8(b)(4)(B)3 of the National Labor Relations Act.-t
In general, clause (i) of 8(b)(4) prohibits, as an unfair labor practice,
a union from inducing any individual employed by a neutral employer to refuse to handle goods or to strike against the neutral
employer, and clause (ii) forbids a union from threatening or coercing the secondary employer directly, if in either case the union's
object is to force the neutral employer to cease dealing with the
primary employer. Although the language of section 8(b)(4)(B) is
quite broad, a proviso to this section specifically exempts primary
strikes and primary picketing from its proscription.I' Moreover, a
1. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950).
2. See generally GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 120-27, 132-53 (2d rev. ed. 1958);
Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44
MINN. L. REV. 257, 271 (1959).
3. 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (Supp. IV, 1963). Section 8(b):
"It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
" .•• (4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage
in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials,
or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where
in either case an object thereof is
" .•• (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any oilier person....."
4. Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 141
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958), as amended, Landrum-Griffin Act, 73 Stat. 542-43
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. IV, 1963).
5. Section 8(b)(4)(B): " .•. Provided, that nothing contained in this clause (B)
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second proviso, the so-called "publicity proviso," protects publicity
activities-other than picketing-by the union for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public that products produced by its adversary are distributed by another employer, so long as the publicity
does not have an effect of inducing work stoppages on the premises
of the neutral.6 When the proscription against activity that threatens
or coerces an employer, clause (ii), was added by the LandrumGriffin amendments7 to the existing ban on secondary activity, most
commentators assumed that all picketing at a secondary site was
per se an unfair labor practice.8 A recent decision by the United
States Supreme Court, NLRB v. Fruit &- Vegetable Packers &- Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits),9 upsets these assumptions.

I. THE Tree Fruits

DECISION

In Tree Fruits, contract negotiations between the Tree Fruits
Labor Relations Committee, representing twenty-one fresh fruit
packing and warehousing firms, and the Teamster's local, representing the employees of these firms, had broken down and an economic
strike had resulted. The union subsequently organized a consumer
boycott of the struck employer's products, and twenty-six Safeway
food stores in Seattle, Washington were picketed by union members carrying placards appealing to customers of Safeway not to
purchase "Washington State" apples.10 The union also distributed
handbills containing a more detailed message to the same effect.
shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary
strike or primary picketing.••." .
6. Section 8(b)(4): " .•• Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph
(4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity,
other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including
consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are
produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute
and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have
the effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary
employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver or transport
any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment ••• engaged in such
distribution." (Emphasis added.)
7. As a part of the 1959 amendments to the act, § 8(b)(4)(A) of the Taft-Hartley
amendments, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1958), became § 8(b)(4)(B).
8. Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV.
L. REY, 1086, 1114 (1960); Cox, supra note 2, at 274; Farmer, The Status and Application of the Secondary-Boycott and Hot Cargo Provisions, 48 GEo. L.J. 327, 341 (1959).
But see Previant, The New Hot-Cargo and Secondary-Boycott Sections: A Critical
Analysis, 48 GEO. L.J. 346, 353 (1959).
9. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964). See Note,
62 CoLUM, L. REv. 1336 (1962); Note, 1962 U. ILL, L.F. 672. See generally Note, 77
HARV. L. REv. 361 (1963); Note, 47 MINN. L. REv. 109 (1962).
10. The placards stated: "To the Consumer: Non-Union Washington State apples
are being sold at this store. Please do not purchase such apples. Thank you. Teamsters
Local 760, Yakima, Washington."
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The union took definite steps to insure that the picketing was directed only at the unfair product and not at Safeway generally. The
pickets were instructed to make no statements to consumers that the
retail stores were unfair and to make no requests of customers to refrain otherwise from patronizing the stores. The union, to avoid a
violation of clause (i) of 8(b)(4), also successfully prevented a sympathetic work stoppage by either the employees of Safeway or any
other employees. Employee entrances to the Safeway stores were
not picketed and union members patrolling the customer entrances
were instructed to explain to Safeway's employees that the sole purpose of the picketing was to enlist the support of consumers against
their employer's product. The primary employer, Tree Fruits, filed
charges against the union, alleging that the union had committed an
unfair labor practice by threatening and coercing Safeway to
cease purchasing Tree Fruits' apples in violation of clause (ii) of
8(b)(4)(B).
The NLRB, relying upon its earlier decision in Upholsterers
Frame and Bedding Workers, 11 held that, under the literal wording
of clause (ii) and the specific negation of picketing in the publicity
proviso, consumer picketing in front of a secondary store was prohibited per se because the natural and foreseeable result of such
picketing, if successful, would be to force or require Safeway to
reduce or discontinue altogether its purchases of such apples from
the struck employers. 12 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia set aside and remanded the Board's order. 13
Looking solely at the language of the statute, the court of appeals
held that the most plausible reading was that clause (ii) of 8(b)(4)
proscribed only conduct that in fact "threatens, coerces or restrains" the secondary employer.14 Thus, the court concluded that
the Board had proceeded on the erroneous premise that the statute
completely banned all consumer picketing and remanded to determine whether there was any substantial economic injury to
II. Upholsterers Workers, Local 61, 132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961), rev'd, 331 F.2d 561
(8th Cir. 1964) (on authority of the Supreme Court holding in Tree Fruits); accord,
New York Typographical Union No. 6, 141 N.L.R.B. 1209 (1963); Retail Store Union,
Dist. 65, 141 N.L.R.B. 991 (1963); Teamsters Union, Local 445, 140 N.L.R.B. 1097
(1963); Bedding Workers, Local 140, 140 N.L.R.B. 343 (1962); Plumbers Union, Local
519, 137 N.L.R.B. 596 (1962); Blueprint Employees, Local 249, 135 N.L.R.B. 1090
(1962); Int'I Typographical Union, Local 154, 135 N.L.R.B. 991 (1962); United Wholesale Employees, Local 261, 129 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1960), modified, 134 N.L.R.B. 931 (1961),
enforced in pertinent part sub nom. Burr v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963).
12. Fruit &: Vegetable Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 132 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961).
The Board also held that the picketing was not intended to induce Safeway's employees to take any kind of action; thus the picketing did not violate clause (i) of
8(b)(4).
13. Fruit and Vegetable Packers, Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
14. Id. at 317.
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Safeway which would support a finding of a threat or coercion.15
The Supreme Court granted the NLRB's petition for certiorari.
Although the Supreme Court, in a six-to-nvo decision, disagreed
with the opinion of the court of appeals that the test was whether
Safeway suffered actual economic loss, the order of the Board was
vacated. 16 The Supreme Court reasoned that the legislative history
of the amendments to 8(b)(4) did not reflect, with requisite clarity,
a congressional plan to prohibit all consumer picketing. The court
distinguished between picketing directed solely at the product of
the primary employer and picketing employed to persuade customers not to trade at all with the secondary employer. Under a
product boycott the secondary employer's purchases from the primary would be decreased only because the public demand for those
goods has been diminished, while in a general consumer boycott
the retailer is persuaded to cease business with the primary by pressure designed to inflict injury on the secondary's business generally.
Product picketing, thus analyzed, was held to fall outside the proscriptions of section 8(b)(4)(B).

A. Legislative History
A fundamental concern with constitutional guarantees of free
speech caused the Supreme Court in Tree Fruits to preface its
analysis with the premise that a ban on peaceful picketing would
not be ascribed to Congress unless it explicitly manifested a purpose
to outlaw such picketing.17 A detailed examination of legislative
history was conducted in search of the "isolated evils" intended to
be proscribed by section 8(b)(4). The Court found no explicit statement by any proponent of the bill that all secondary picketing was
to be banned or, in particular, that picketing directed exclusively
at a product was to be considered unfair. Rather, it was found that
the proponents had made assertions typified by the following:
"The amendment . . . covers pressure in the form of dissuading customers from dealing with secondary employers. That refers to establishing a picket line around a merchant's store,
when the merchant handles the product of a company or of a
manufacturing plant in which there is a strike. In other words,
that is a form of coercion against an innocent employer, in an
effort to compel the employer . . . to come to terms with the
union." 18
15. Id. at 318.
16. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) Gustice Black
concurring and Justices Harlan and Stewart dissenting).
17. NLRB v. Drivers, Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960),
18. 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPoRTINC AND
DISCLOSURE Acr OF 1959, at 1194 (1959) (Senator McClellan) [hereinafter cited as 2
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Although it would be possible to read this statement as calling for
a general ban on all secondary picketing, including product picketing, the Supreme Court interpreted it as a specific statement of
congressional intent that only picketing aimed at stopping all
patronage of the neutral be banned.
The Court's decision to allow some consumer picketing in the
form of product picketing is questionable in view of the congressional proponents' statements; it is even more difficult to supportmore specifically, a different meaning might be attributed to the
proponent's statements-when certain statements of the members
of the conference committee are examined. Senator Morse, illustrating with an example of product picketing substantially the
same as that presented in Tree Fruits, stated that this type of
picketing would be banned under the conference agreement. 19 The
Court, however, rejected Senator Morse's interpretation on the
ground that he had refused to sign the agreement and opponents
in their zeal to defeat a bill understandably tend to overstate its
reach. 20 Such an assumption is pure conjecture, and it seems as
reasonable to assume that Senator Morse, as a participant in the
committee's negotiations, would not at this late point in the
debate risk an overstatement, which might be taken as reflecting
the consensus of the committee, unless such a meaning was in
fact what the committee intended. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any other conferee disputing Senator Morse's assertion.
The Board, in formulating its theory of a per se ban, had
relied most heavily on a statement by Senator Kennedy summarizing the purpose of the proviso.
"[T]he Senate conferees insisted that the report secure the following rights: . . . (c) The right to appeal to consumers by
methods other than picketing asking them to refrain from buying goods made by nonunion labor and to refrain from trading
with a retailer who sells such goods. . . . \Ve were not able to
persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in front of
the secondary shop, but we were able to persuade them to agree
LEGis. HIST.]; see generally 2 LEcxs. HIST, 1386 (Senator Goldwater); 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1615
(Congressman Griffin).
19. "It also makes it illegal for a union to 'coerce, or restrain.' This prohibits
consumer picketing. What is consumer picketing? A shoe manufacturer sells his
product through a department store. • • • The employees, in addition to picketing
the manufacturer, also picket at the premises of the department store with a sign
saying, 'Do not buy X shoes.' This is consumer picketing, an appeal to the public not
to buy the product of a struck manufacturer.'' 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1426.
20. Another opponent stated that under the amendment: "Unions can only ad•
vertise against an establishment selling unfair goods. Picket lines are illegal where
there is no primary dispute.'' 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1734 (Congressman Libonati). See also
2 LEGxs. HIST. 1037 (Senator Humphrey).
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that the union shall be free to conduct informational activity
short of picketing." 21
Even without the aid of this history behind the publicity proviso,
the Board had held that, in permitting appeals to consumers by
methods other than picketing, the proviso manifested an intent to
prohibit all consumer picketing.22 In the Board's view, Senator Kennedy's summary simply reaffirmed this intent,23 indicating that the
House bill as it existed before conference allowed no picketing and
that the effort made in conference to relax this restriction was unsuccessful,2¼ although some publicity not involving picketing was to be
allowed. 25 The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation. The
Court, emphasizing the word "and" in Senator Kennedy's statement, held that it, in effect, meant it is permissible to ask consumers
via picketing "to refrain from buying goods made by nonunion
labor" so long as the union does not in addition ask the public
to boycott the neutral. It would seem at least an equally plausible
reading, however, that Senator Kennedy was listing two separate
restrictions, the first explicitly prohibiting product picketing.26 In
addition, other assertions are disclosed in the legislative history
that also indicate product picketing was to be prohibited.27
It is true, as the Court says, that Congress did not specifically
recognize the distinction between product and general consumer
picketing and that there was no statement explicitly prohibiting
product picketing. The preponderance of the history, however,
supports the Board's view that Congress did not wish to make any
distinction in regard to consumer picketing, but rather such activity was to be banned per se because all types of secondary picketing necessarily coerce the neutral.
21. 2 LEcIS. HIST. 1431-32 (Emphasis added.)
22. See note ll supra and accompanying text.
23. Upholsterers Workers, Local 61, 132 N.L.R.B. 40, 61 (1961), rev'd, 56 L.R.R.M.
2164 (8th Cir. 1964).
24. Id. at 61; Aaron, supra note 8, at lll4; Cox, supra note 2, at 274.
25. Ibid.
26. See note 27 infra.
27. "Under the language of the conference report we agreed that there would not
be picketing at a secondary site. What was permitted was the giving out of handbills
or information through the radio, and so forth." 2 LEcIS. Hisr. 1389 (Senator Kennedy).
The amendment " •.• prohibits secondary customer picketing at a retail store which
happens to sell [a] product produced by [a] manufacturer with whom [the] union
has [a] dispute." 2 LEcIS. HIST. 1712 (Analysis of the conference agreement by Congressman Griffin). "Employees will also be entitled to publicize, without picketing, the
fact that a wholesaler or retailer sells goods of a company involved in a labor dispute.
All appeals for a consumer boycott would have been barred by the House bill." 2
LEcIS. HIST. 1720 (Analysis of the changes made in conference by Congressman Thompson) (Emphasis added.); 2 LEcIS. HIST. 1706 (Congressman Thompson); 2 LECis. HIST.
1437 (Senator Goldwater); note 19 supra.
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B. The Primary-Secondary Dichotomy
After determining the limited scope of section 8(b)(4), the Court
turned to the question of whether the product picketing in Tree
Fruits fell within the area of secondary consumer picketing that
Congress clearly had indicated an intention to prohibit. The Court
recognized that the effect of a product boycott on the neutral is a
decrease in sales of the unfair product, and that such a decrease
would result in a violation of the literal terms of clause (ii)(B) because the neutral would necessarily be forced to cease dealing with
the primary employer to the extent of the decrease in his consumer
sales of the products. Likewise, an appeal to cease buying a product
is clearly an appeal to customers to cease dealing with the neutral,
at least to the extent of the one product, thus violating the literal
terms of the proponents' statements. The Court held, however, that
upholding a ban on consumer picketing merely because it caused
a decrease in consumer purchases violated the "spirit" of the statute. By picketing only the product, the union's appeal was confined,
in 'a sense, to its dispute with the primary employer; thus, the
union was just expanding the site of the primary dispute to the
secondary premises. The Court contrasted this activity with picketing to induce a general consumer boycott, which creates a separate
dispute with the secondary employer.

II.

THE THEORY OF PRODUCT PICKETING AS "PRIMARY" ACTIVITY

The Court, by introducing as a consideration the "primary"
nature of the Tree Fruits picketing, raised the troublesome problem of distinguishing between primary and secondary activity, a
distinction which is generally determinative of whether conduct
falls within the proscriptions of 8(b)(4)(B).28 It has been said that
the most stable element in the struggle with the problems presented by the primary-secondary dichotomy has been discord. 29 The
decision in Tree Fruits only adds to the confusion surrounding this
dichotomy. The difficulties of distinction are compounded by the
fact that the Court does not expressly label the picketing as primary
activity, but merely analogizes it to that which is primary activity. 30
This is regrettable because what is needed in this area is a deeper
examination of the theory involved in interpreting section 8(b)(4)
28. The use of the term "secondary boycott" was originally adopted by the courts
in applying § 8(b)(4)(B); it was only upon the adoption of the primary picketing
proviso as pan of the 1959 amendments, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B)
(Supp. IV, 1963), that Congress explicitly recognized the primary-secondary dichotomy.
29. Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 1363,
1365 (1962).
30. "[T)he Union's appeal is closely confined to the primary dispute." '!,77 U.S. at
72. (Emphasis added.)
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(B) and the development of a rationale to serve as a starting point
both for the courts in presently applying the statute and for the
legislature in drafting further secondary boycott legislation.31 At least
one comprehensive attempt has been made, by Professor Howard
Lesnick, to provide a rationale to explain and define the primarysecondary dichotomy. 32 Although Professor Lesnick limits his examination to the "common situs," 33 "roving situs,"34 and "reserved
gate"35 problems, application of his rationale to consumer picketing indicates that perhaps the Court's instinct in analogizing product picketing to primary activity was theoretically correct.
Professor Lesnick first states that one can not profitably analyze
solely the effects on the neutral in a particular labor dispute because Congress has not considered harm to the neu_tral objectionable
per se.86 On the contrary, Congress has given a wide latitude to the
right to strike even though almost every strike causes economic
loss to neutrals, and these losses from primary strikes far outweigh the
usual losses caused by secondary activity.87 In addition, the intentional infliction of harm on the neutral by the union does not necessarily render the conduct secondary, for even in the traditional
primary strike the union hopes that the secondary will put pressure on the primary because of a disruption of the secondary's
business caused by the shutdown or delay of the primary's production.88 Nevertheless, the most important consideration in
analyzing the primary-secondary dichotomy is the union's intent.
The intent that is significant for Professor Lesnick, however, is the
intent "to subject the secondary to pressure different in kind from
that generated against him by a primary strike." 39 More specifically,
if a business is shut down by a primary strike, normal business relations with the customers of that business are adversely affected,
causing an economic loss to the secondary employer. Thus, while
the secondary may or may not feel compelled because of his losses
to try to persuade the primary to settle his dispute, the pressure
generating the secondary employer's reaction "flows entirely from
the disruption of the primary employer's business."40 However,
31. "The dichotomy between primary and secondary activity is unquestionably
the area of greatest difficulty and importance in the administration of the statute
•..•" Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes and Boycotts-Another Chapter, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 125, 129 (1959).
32. Lesnick, supra note 29.
33. E.g., Sailor's Union, 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
34. E.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 861, 135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962).
35. E.g., International Union of Elec. Workers, Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667
(1961).
36. Lesnick, supra note 29, at 1411.
37. Tower, A Perspective on Secondary Boycotts, 2 LAB. L.J. 727, 732 (1951).
38. Lesnick, supra note 29, at 1412.
39. Id. at 1412. (Emphasis added.)
40. Id. at 1413.
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when the primary union induces the neutral's employees to refuse
to perform their jobs, the effect is one independent of consequences
that normally results from a shutdown of the primary premises. As
such it is "different in kind" and, therefore, secondary.41
Applying this "different in kind" test to Tree Fruits, a theoretical basis for labeling product picketing as primary rather than secondary can be articulated. Most simply, the initial objective of a
union's primary action against an employer who deals in goods is
to prevent the sale of those goods, thus causing the employer, because of the economic injury, to capitulate to union demands. This
may be accomplished by a strike causing a production slowdown or
shut-down of the primary's plant; it may be accomplished by inducing employees of the secondary to refuse to cross the picket line
at the primary premises in order to pick up the goods; or it might
be effected by roving situs picketing to induce the primary employees to refrain from unloading the goods at the secondary
premises. 42 Under the "effect different in kind" analysis, picketing
to induce consumers to refrain from buying the product is merely
another way of exerting direct pressure on the primary's business.
The union, by labeling the product unfair, still attempts to prevent
sale of the primary employer's goods, but the attempt is directed
toward those persons and at that time and place where it would
have the greatest effect-an appeal to the ultimate consumers of
the goods and immediately prior to the potential sale. If the picketing is successful, the retailer may be compelled for self-protection
to cease stocking the primary employer's goods because there is no
longer a market for them. However, the retailer would also have to
stop handling the goods if the traditionally recognized primary action
at the primary's premises had succeeded because then the goods
41. An example of the application of this rationale is presented in the General
Electric reserved gate decision. International Union of Elec. Workers, Local 761 v.
NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961). The Supreme Court in this case held that an entrance to
a plant reserved for neutral employees engaged in work on the neutral premises may
be picketed but only when the employees are performing work unrelated to the
normal operation of the plant. Applying Professor Lesnick's rationale, if the neutral
employees' work were related to the normal operation of the plant, for example, maintenance work, closing of the primary plant would abrogate the need for the neutral's
services, thus causing an economic loss to the neutral. Such a loss would be "primary"
because it would flow directly from the disruption caused by the primary strike.
Consequently, picketing a reserved gate through which such neutral employees pass
would also be primary because its effect on the neutral employer would not be
"different in kind" from a successful strike at the primary plant. On the other hand,
if the work was unrelated, for example the neutral was a lessee on the premises, a
disruption of the primary operation of the plant would have no impact on the neutral.
Therefore, an appeal to the neutral's employees in this situation by picketing in front
of their reserved gate would be "different in kind" and thus "secondary." For the
application of this rationale to primary situs, common situs, and roving situs problems,
see generally Lesnick, supra note 29, at 1411-30.
42. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 861, 135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962).
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would be unattainable. On the other hand, if the picketing at the
retailer's place of business goes beyond an effort to inform the
public that a particular product sold by the secondary is being
produced by an unfair employer and becomes an attempt to persuade the public to cease dealing generally with the secondary, the
neutral would be subjected to a loss of business "different in kind"
from that caused by successful primary action; closing the primary
plant would have no effect on the retailer's general patronage except
as it affected the primary product.43
III. PossrnLE

LIMITATIONS ON THE ScoPE OF

Tree Fruits

The rationale outlined above supports the Court's theory that
product picketing is to be associated with primary activity. However, one of the principal difficulties presented by the Tree Fruits
decision is that no specific damage was shown by Safeway, and,
thus, the Court confined itself to a discussion of the theory of product picketing. There are, however, a number of complications
which may arise when a product is picketed. It is difficult to predict how the addition of facts other than those of Tree Fruits, when
presented in future cases, will affect what on its face appears to be
a broad and general sanction of product picketing. Nevertheless,
it is of some benefit to examine these situations and the arguments
that can be made toward limiting the apparently broad scope of
Tree Fruits.
One possible limitation on product picketing could be raised in
situations where the picketing has some demonstrable effect on the
secondary's general consumer patronage. It is doubtful that the
only harm to Safeway from product picketing was a loss of
sales of the primary product, regardless of the precautions taken
by the union. It has often been recognized that a picket line suggests a sort of psychological embargo around the picketed premises,
43. A somewhat different analysis is suggested in the minority common-law cases,
footnoted by the court, which recognize the product boycott-general consumer boycott
distinction. The leading case is Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910
(1937), which allowed product picketing at a delicatessen serving meat produced by
an employer with which the union had a dispute. The New York court in upholding
the picketing suggested that a "unity of interest" was created between the retailer
and the manufacturer on the theory that, since the unfair manufacturer pays less than
union wages, both it and the retailer who sells the product are in a position to undersell competitors. Or as another court stated it, the one who sells the product of a
primary becomes an ally by providing an outlet for the unfair product. Fortenbury
v. Superior Ct., 16 Cal. 2d 405, 106 P.2d 411 (1940). Carrying this to the extreme, it
would seem that this theory would justify coercion including a general consumer
boycott. The common-law courts following Goldfinger, however, have universally
applied the same distinction as the Supreme Court applied in Tree Fruits by denying
the union the right to picket the secondary employer to persuade the public to withdraw its patronage generally. The fact that this distinction is made would indicate
that underlying considerations for the common-law rule are those outlined in the text.
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depending for its persuasiveness on the associations most people
have in mind when they think of picketing,44 thus inducing action
"quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated."45 Therefore, the product picketing may very well have
the "signal" effect of causing many members of the public to cease
patronizing Safeway entirely, thereby achieving the effect of a
general consumer boycott against a secondary employer. As a minimum, a picket line will tend to harm Safeway's goodwill and public
image since anyone glancing at a picketed Safeway store is likely to
assume that Safeway itself is being branded as unfair. 46
In Tree Fruits, the only effect on Safeway attributed to product
picketing by the Court was a loss in sales of the primary product.
However, the Court also stated that picketing "requesting the public to not trade at all with the neutral" would be coercive within
the proscriptions of 8(b)(4) because it would cause a general consumer boycott. But the opinion does not make clear the effect a
showing of actual economic loss would have upon the lawfulness of
the product picketing. Arguably, therefore, if the effect of a general
consumer boycott were shown to have resulted from product picketing, the picketing could constitute coercion of the neutral in violation of section 8(b)(4). On the other hand, since product picketing
has now been held valid, perhaps it would be unjust to deprive the
union of the right to product picket because of incidental effects
the union is powerless to prevent beyond taking the precautions
utilized in Tree Fruits. 41 Furthermore, a limitation requiring evidence of a neutral's general consumer patronage loss would create
a morass of administrative difficulties. The proof necessary to show
the damage, and the degree of damage which must be shown, would
be difficult standards to formulize. 48 Both the neutral and the union
44. See note 45 infra.
45. Bakery &: Pastry Drivers, Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (concurring opinion by Justice Douglas). Picketing " ••. establishes a locus in quo that
has far more potential for inducing action or nonaction than the message the pickets
convey ••.." Building Serv. Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950); Hughes
v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Teamsters Union v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
46. "To a loyal unionist it is both a spontaneous plea not to engage in any
business activity with those behind the picket curtain and an instantaneous branding
of 'unfairness' on those engaged in activity behind the picket line," Superior Derrick
Corp. v. NLRB, 273 F.2d 891, 896 (5th Cir. 1960).
47. Professor Lesnick's solution to the problem of adverse incidental effects different in kind is to allow the picketing to the extent that such effects do not occur.
In the common and roving situs cases, where picketing at secondary premises is
allowed, there is often the danger, in preserving the right to primary action, that the
secondary's employees will be induced to refuse to cross the picket line. Professor
Lesnick argues, although it is not clear that it is the law, that the picketing union
should be responsible to see that secondary employees are not so induced, feeling that
the union in most cases is in a position to prevent it. Lesnick, supra note 29, at 1429.
48. See the criticism of the circuit court's holding in Tree Fruits, which required
a showing of economic loss, in Burr v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 612, 620 (1963).
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have legitimate interests to protect in this situation, and it would
be difficult to predict without a specific factual situation which
argument will prevail. It should be noted, however, that an actual
general consumer patronage loss will seldom arise because it is
doubtful that most neutrals would be willing to suffer the necessary
damage in order to test the scope of Tree Fruits. Rather, they will
be inclined to cease dealing with the primary simply upon the
threat of picketing.49
A second possible limitation of the Tree Fruits holding is suggested by Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent. 50 Justice Harlan argued that
the majority's distinction is tenuous if the picketed retailer depends largely or entirely on sales of the struck product. 51 For example, if an independent gas station mvner purchases gasoline from
a struck fi.rm, 52 arguably he would be as injured by picketing
that appeals to his consumers to refrain from buying his gasoline
because it originated from an unfair source as by picketing that appeals to his consumers to refrain entirely from patronizing his gas
station. If the product picketing is successful in this situation it will
result in a virtual shutdown of the neutral's business. In Tree
Fruits, the Court's only basis for holding that a decrease in consumer sales caused by product picketing does not violate the literal
terms of the statute is that such an interpretation is not within the
"spirit" of the statute, seemingly because the harm to Safeway
would be minimal. If it could be shown that the retailer is suffering
substantial economic losses, perhaps the picketing should be barred,
since the major concern of Congress in prohibiting secondary activity was a concern over the burdens imposed on neutrals by such
activity.58 However, if Tree Fruits were so limited, again the problem of determining the degree of harm that must be shown would
pose difficulties. More importantly, such a limitation would not be
consistent with the apparent theory of product picketing that it
is primary activity, and thus activity which the union should have
available to appeal to the public. Nevertheless, the fact that the
equities in each particular factual situation are likely to control
the decision of whether the "one product" neutral should be protected makes it difficult again to predict to what extent Tree Fruits
may be so limited.
A third possible limitation on the Tree Fruits sanction of
product picketing arises from an assumption stated earlier that
most neutrals will cease dealing with the primary upon the mere
49. See text accompanying notes 55-61 infra.
50. 377 U.S. at 80.
51. Id. at 83.
52. An example of such a factual situation at common law was Alliance Auto
Serv., Inc. v. Cohen, 341 Pa. 283, 19 A.2d 152 (1941).
53. E.g., 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1615.
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threat of product picketing. That a neutral does, in fact, frequently
so react is supported by a significant number of Board decisions.
The NLRB in deciding Tree Fruits, because of the lack of evidence
of economic harm, was limited to a finding that the "natural and
foreseeable result" of the Tree Fruits product picketing was to
coerce and restrain the neutral. 54 In other cases involving product
picketing, however, the Board has found that when the union approached a neutral and threatened to picket unless he acceded to
its demands, the retailer ceased selling the product rather than
face a picket line. 55 In addition, upon the threats of picketing by
the union, neutrals have removed the products from public display,56 refused to accept goods already ordered, 57 refused to order
more goods,58 and ceased advertising the goods. 59 These cases provided the NLRB with enough evidence to hold not only that coercion of the neutral was the natural and foreseeable result of
product picketing, but also that such coercion was, in fact, the result. 60 The reasons in these cases for the neutrals' decision to cease
dealing entirely rather than to have their premises picketed were
not expressly set out. Presumably, however, it was because of the
fear of the concomitant adverse effects previously suggested.
The Supreme Court in sanctioning product picketing said, "if
the appeal succeeds, the secondary employers' purchases from the
struck firms are decreased only because the public has diminished
its purchases of the struck product." 61 The Court also said a violation of 8(b)(4) would not occur if the neutral dropped the product
as a poor seller because the picketing was successful in reducing
the neutral's sales of the product. The Court, however, seemingly
because it failed to consider the signal aspects of all picketingincluding product picketing-did not say whether evidence that a
neutral had ceased business with the primary upon the threat
of picketing would have any effect on the validity of product picketing. Therefore, it is possible such a showing would result in a
limitation on Tree Fruits' sanction of product picketing. Despite
the Court's language, the probability of the union doing significant
damage to its adversary by appeals to the public through a product
54. 132 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1177 (1961).
55. Teamsters Union, Local 445, 140 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099 (1963); Bedding Workers,
Local 140, 140 N.L.R.B. 343, 357-58 (1963); Blueprint Employees, Local 249, 135
N.L.R.B. 1090, 1094-95 (1962).
56. Teamsters Union, Local 445, supra note 55, at 1100; Bedding ·workers, Local
140, supra note 55, at 357-58.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Bedding Workers, Local 140, supra note 55, at 357-58.
60. Cases cited note 55 supra.
61. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 72 (1964). (Emphasis
added.)
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picket is slight when compared with the pressure the union can
exert on the primary through the secondary. The latter's desire to
avoid threatened product picketing at his premises will cause him
to cease dealing with the primary employer or to attempt to persuade the primary employer to settle the labor dispute. Significantly,
the union would thereby engender the neutral's aid simply by
threat, without ever having to persuade the public to aid the union
voluntarily.
There are, however, considerations which militate persuasively against a limitation on the Tree Fruits sanction of product
picketing when the neutral reacts to a threat of product picketing.
First, a complete business cessation by the secondary with the
primary does not do violence to the theory explaining the primarysecondary dichotomy outlined above, because a total cessation could
also be the result of traditionally recognized primary activity.
Second, establishing such a limitation on the Tree Fruits holding
would be almost entirely for the benefit of the primary employer,
since the choices open to the neutral remain the same. However,
Congress in drafting section 8(b)(4) evidenced no concern for the
effects of secondary activity on the primary employer. Third, the
proposed limitation would seemingly allow the creation of a union
unfair labor practice at the whim of the neutral employer. It would
be difficult to guard against collusion between the neutral and the
struck employer whereby the neutral would engage in a sham business cessation, undertaken only for the purpose of ridding itself
of the pickets and lasting only until a section IO(l) injunction of
the picketing is ordered. Finally, there is some possibility that the
recent Servette case could be used as authority to uphold the
union's use of a threat of a product picket to apply secondary
pressure. 62
62. Section 10(1) of the act allows an injunction to be issued as soon as there is
reasonable cause to believe an 8(b)(4)(B) violation has been committed. 73 Stat. 544
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 169(1) (Supp. IV, 1963).
Arguably, a logical extension of the Supreme Court's recent holding in NLRB v.
Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964), precludes a limitation on the right to product picket
based upon a showing that cessation resulted from a threat to picket. Servette involved
a union threat to pass out handbills appealing to consumers to refrain from buying an
unfair primary product at the secondary retail store. One question presented in
Servette was whether a threat to handbill made to the managers of the stores was an
inducement of "an individual employed by any person" in violation of clause (i) of
section 8(b)(4)(B). The Court held that there was no violation because the
warning by the union of its intent to handbill was an appeal for the exercise of
managerial discretion, rather than an appeal to employees, and, therefore, not an
illegal inducement. In addition, the Court found no violation of clause (ii) of section
8(b)(4)(B); the Court held handbilling protected by the publicity proviso and, a
fortiori, that the threat to handbill, which was the situation in Servette, should also be
protected. Arguably, a general rule could be inferred from this later holding that if
the union's proposed conduct, whether handbilling or product picketing, is recognized as legal, reaction by the neutral's management, who will generally be the
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SUMMARY

Although there are possible ways of finding a middle ground to
control the extent of the right to product picket, it is doubtful
that any significant curb on this right will be made by the Board
or courts in view of the present state of the law and the difficulties
that would attach to any limitation. Whether the Supreme Court's
sanction of product picketing in Tree Fruits should stand will
ultimately have to be faced by Congress. Professor Lesnick's rationale has initial validity in determining theoretically whether the
picketing in question is primary or secondary. It must be recognized, however, that when the union's actions are based on "following the unfair product," the probability of undesirable secondary
effects flowing from the theoretically primary action may outweigh
the advantages provided the union in allowing it a right to product
picket. At this point Congress might well decide to prohibit the
activity because of its adverse secondary effects even though it might
be called primary under Professor Lesnick's test. Even if Congress
does not take this step, it is possible the courts will conduct a deeper
analysis of secondary activity and conclude that when the secondary
effects of union activity become dominant, the union will be presumed to intend such effects, and, because such effects are different
in kind from those the neutral would experience under more traditional primary activity, such activity might yet be categorized as
secondary.
A helpful analogy is suggested by clause (i) of 8(b)(4), prohibiting a union's inducement of the employees of the neutral. 03 If the
theory of product picketing as primary activity is that the primary
dispute is to a limited degree expanded to the secondary premises
by following the unfair goods, this same reasoning should allow
the union to induce the employees of the neutral to cease handling
the primary goods. 64 If the secondary employees were to cease
recipient of the threat, to a threat to engage in the conduct will not impair the
validity of the conduct. Perhaps, however, threats to picket should be distinguished
from threats to handbill because of a possible difference between the two in the
reasonableness of the neutral's fear of secondary effects. It may reasonably be assumed
that in the situation where a mere threat of picketing or handbilling causes the
neutral to cease dealing with the union's adversary the only explanation for the
neutral's business cessation is a fear of the secondary (incidental) effects of the
picketing or handbilling, since the neutral's lost sales of the product resulting from
a product boycott could only approach but never surpass the impact of a voluntary
business cessation with the primary. It is the fear of a loss of general consumer patron•
age or goodwill which prompts the neutral, not actual losses in the sales of the
products. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra. Thus, because of the "signal"
aspect of picketing, not present to substantial degree in handbilling, the retailer may
be more justified in fearing a loss of general patronage.
63. 73 Stat. 449 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (Supp. IV, 1963), quoted note
3 supra.

64. Professor Lesnick recognized that this consideration complicated his rationale
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dealing with the goods, thus preventing their sale, this in itself
would not be pressure different in kind from primary action preventing the goods from reaching the neutral's premises in the first
place. However, a union inducement of employees to refuse to
work with the goods of another employer is generally prohibited by
clause (i) of section 8 (b) (4). 615 Seemingly, the reason for banning
this theoretically primary activity in clause (i) of the statute is
that the secondary effects are no longer incidental, but have become
dominant. If the employees of a retailer could refuse to handle
every unfair product that passes through a retail store, it would
cause considerable disruption of the retailer's operation, and it
seems unfair to the neutral to incite workers satisfied with their
a,;vn conditions.66 Similarly, the probability of product picketing
signaling a general consumer boycott may be deemed such a dominant secondary effect as to call for a ban on the activity.
The problem demands not only examination of the secondary
effects of picketing but also examination of the alternative methods
of publicizing a labor dispute, such as handbilling and advertising,
currently protected by the publicity proviso.07 The strongest argu·
ment in favor of the use of product picketing is that the public
traditionally associates "picketing" with a labor dispute. 68 Thus,
picketing, because it instantly signals a labor dispute, distinguishes
this kind of union plea from other types of publicity campaigns,
including those which utilize handbilling and advertising.69 &
previously noted, however, picketing is likely to signal the public
that the employer being picketed is unfair to labor in addition to
the more generalized notification of the existence of a labor dispute. 70 By limiting the union appeals to informational activity short
of picketing, the appeal to consumers to honor the "picket line"
does not arise. Conceivably, under a product picketing ban the
consistent use of handbilling may eventually come to signal a labor
dispute; however, instead of also signaling that the neutral is un-fair, handbilling would signal a product boycott and union sympathizers would readily accept and read the leaflets. Thus, handbilling could approach the effectiveness of picketing as a method of
informing the public that the neutral is selling a product produced
and thus to avoid the problem of "following the product," he modified his rule.
Lesnick, supra note 29, at 1414.
65. An exception to this generalization is presented in the reserved gate situation,
see note 41 supra.
66. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Ar::r, 1947, at 1107
(1948) (Senator Taft).
67. 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (Supp. IV, 1963), quoted note 6 supra.
68. See generally 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1427 (Senator Morse). Hellerstein, Secondary Boy•
cotts in Labor Disputes, 47 YALE L.J. 341, 350 (1938).
69. Ibid.
70. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
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by the union's adversary. 71 If product picketing continues to be
sanctioned, in order to prevent the effects of a general consumer
boycott, the public must be educated in the distinction between
picketing directed at the product and picketing directed at the
neutral employer. Arguably, however, it would be easier to limit
product boycotts to handbilling and to educate consumers that
handbilling signals a product boycott than it would be to continue
a right to product picket and teach the public to govern its reaction
by the message on the placard and not by the fact of picketing itself.
Since picketing involves an element of free speech, when a
congressional ban on picketing is contemplated, first amendment
guarantees must be considered. Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring
opinion in Tree Fruits, disagreed with the majority and argued that
Congress did intend a per se ban on consumer picketing and that
such a prohibition was unconstitutional.72 Justice Black recognized
that picketing is sometimes more than free speech because of
its signal nature in inducing action irrespective of the ideas
attempted to be communicated and, thus, is sometimes subject to
regulation. He argued, however, that Congress' ban on consumer
picketing did not manifest any concern with picketing itself,
but rather the ban seemed intended only to "prevent dissemination
of information about the facts of a labor dispute . . . ." 73 However, a congressional ban on product picketing expressly based on
the danger that the signal nature of picketing will cause a general
consumer boycott, the prospect that other methods of publicity may
be as effective as picketing, and the administrative difficulties inherent in any middle ground approach of permitting some but not
all product picketing would seem to satisfy Mr. Justice Black's first
71. This would present the issue of distinguishing between handbilling and
picketing. There is no authority giving precise definitions of either of these terms.
Traditionally, however, picketing suggests patrolling with placards while handbilling
suggests a more or less stationary distribution of leaflets. There has been only one case
decided in which handbilling took on a characteristic of picketing. Service Employees,
Local 399 (Bums Detective Agency), 136 N.L.R.B. 431 (1962). In this case the union
was held to have threatened and coerced a secondary employer in violation of clause
(ii) of § 8(b)(4) when twenty to seventy union members patrolled in an elliptical
path in front of the main entrance of a sports arena, some passing out handbills but
none carrying placards. Two members of the Board held expressly that this conduct
was picketing. Two other members declined to decide the question of whether the
activity was picketing but merely held that this was not the traditional means of
handbilling and therefore not protected by the publicity proviso. Although nothing
conclusive is indicated by the Bums case, it would seem that the proper test in the
secondary boycott area for distinguishing picketing from handbilling is whether the
conduct is likely to have the signal aspect of labeling the neutral as unfair. Thus,
whether the "handbilling" is accompanied by patrolling or the carrying or posting
of signs of any sort and the number of union members present are all factors to
consider.
72. 377 U.S. at 76.
73. Id. at 78.
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amendment objections and to be supported by existing case authority upholding proscriptions on the right to picket.74

Michael A. Warner
74. See cases cited note 45 supra.

